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Abstract
High quality educational outcomes are a coveted item throughout the advanced
industrialized world. This paper is a quantitative analysis of the educational outcomes of
thirty-seven Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) member
countries. The overarching goal is to determine what variables account for this variation.
Causes investigated include the type of party system, wealth, inequality, health of democracy,
government spending on education, access to affordable healthcare, and student-teacher
ratios. Socioeconomic variables, including wealth and income inequality, and the level of
political freedom have the greatest impact on quality of education. Other more bureaucratic
factors, including access to healthcare, student-teacher ratios, and government spending, show
a smaller, less significant impact.
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“One child, one teacher, one pen, and one book can change the world.”
- Pakistani education activist, Malala Yousafzai (Husain, 2015)
Introduction
It is no surprise that education is of great importance throughout the world. Attainment
of quality education is held in high regard by educators, parents, policymakers, and world
leaders alike. Education has been lauded as a pathway out of poverty (Montecel, 2013). But
like a double-edged sword, poverty and inequality often lead to poorer educational outcomes
as well (Verner, 1979). We see that low-income countries where there is a greater extent of
poverty and inequality have much poorer educational outcomes than high- or middle-income
countries (Cigano, 2014). While education can help people attain knowledge and skills to lift
them out of poverty, a level of financial support and investment into these educational
institutions is necessary to reach that point. Even more personally, hunger and
malnourishment contribute to toxic stress, limiting students’ cognitive bandwidth, reducing
their ability to concentrate because they are too hungry to focus on anything else (Chilton &
Rabinowich, 2012). Beyond this, education is important not only in low-income, developing
countries, but in industrialized and developed economies, especially within the competitive,
globalized economy of the 21 st century. As are most topics within the social sciences,
education exhibits a great deal of nuance and encompasses a large swath of information. The
lines between what quality education creates and what creates quality education are often
blurred by their reciprocal nature. From the perspective of policymaking, there is a keen
interest in understanding exactly what can help bolster an educational system to produce high
quality outcomes. I will specifically investigate the factors that account for cross-national
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variation in educational outcomes 1 in Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) member countries. Figure 1Error! Bookmark not defined. illustrates
the variation in outcomes in a small sampling of six OECD member countries. The outcomes
vary both between countries and over time.

PISA reading scores 2000-2018
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Because policymakers, who are often elected or appointed by elected officials, have
such clear and direct influence over the creation, prioritization, and funding of educational
policy, research into the institutional effects of the systems that elect thes e policymakers may
play a role in shaping their educational goals. Specifically, this paper’s novel inquiry involves
the possible effects of the two main types of political party systems, two-party and multi-party
systems. Considering the complexity of comparative educational policy and in line with the
existing literature on the subject, several other determinants will be analyzed in tandem. These
important casual factors including health of democracy, wealth, income inequality, public
education expenditure per student, affordability of healthcare, and student-teacher ratios.

1

Represented by reading scores from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
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Examining the structure of political and educational systems will give insight to the
goals of our leaders. The results of this paper can help inform what actions must be taken by
elected officials within OECD member countries in order to improve our educational
outcomes. These actions may include taking measures to reduce income inequality, to bolster
economic growth, to discover more efficient ways to spend public funds on education, to
create policy to reduce the number of students in classrooms, or to push leaders to make broad
systemic changes in structures such as party systems. Ultimately, I seek to discover the
conditions conducive to the best possible educational outcomes through a cross-national
study.
The Influence of Political Party Systems
In liberal democracies, there are two main types of political party systems: two -party
systems and multi-party systems. Single party systems do exist in some democratic states, but
for the purpose of this paper I am focusing specifically on two- and multi-party systems.
According to Duverger’s Law, the root difference between these two systems is in the
structure of their elections (Lijphart, 1999). The manner in which officials are selected by the
people is inextricably linked to the type of party system present. Countries that have first past
the post (FPTP) voting for single member districts where only a plurality of votes is required
to win, like the United States, tend to result in two-party systems (Lijphart, 1999). Several
other electoral systems, like ranked choice voting or multi-member districts, are referred to as
proportional representation (PR) systems and often result in multi-party systems (Lijphart,
1999).
There is considerable debate about the supposed merits of each system in practicality
and their respective abilities to represent democracy. FPTP systems are often deemed less fair
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because seats are awarded disproportionately compared to the vote share won by each party.
They are often extremely competitive and lead to vote-seeking, where the primary goal of
officials is to win votes (Nishikawa, 2012). This contrasts with PR systems that are less
competitive due to their reliance on building coalitions to govern (Nishikawa, 2012). Because
of this, PR systems are able to make policy the primary focus of elections, at least to a higher
degree than FPTP systems, theoretically (Strøm, 1990). Due to these features, it is intuitive
that to participate in a meaningful way, knowledge of policy, especially the ability to
differentiate parties’ policies from one another, is key to a party’s success within a multiparty
system. Furthermore, in FPTP systems parties tend to cluster around the center of the political
spectrum, contrasting with PR systems whose parties tend to be more spread out ideologically
(Nishikawa, 2012). Elites in these different parties within multiparty systems would benefit
from a politically educated electorate that could determine what policies they support. On th e
other hand, two-party systems by nature only have two parties that tend to be closely related
in ideology and perceived as mirror opposites by the public (Nicholson et al., 2012).
Because of these differences, a politically educated electorate would not benefit twoparty systems with the same gravity as it would benefit multiparty systems. Multiparty
systems would gain significant benefits from a system with higher educational outcomes
because the electorate would be better poised to differentiate and align with a political party
congruent with their political opinions. Differentiating parties and understanding the
consequences of coalition building are needed to succeed in a multiparty system. As the
number of parties increase, the information and policy knowledge needed to differentiate and
assess one’s support increases as well. In order to ensure that their electorate is educated to
differentiate policy and parties under their common goal to seek votes and win elections, it is
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intuitive that political parties would have an increased stake in high educational outcomes.
This can be contrasted with two-party systems since the need for nuance, understanding
coalitions, or differentiating parties and policies is much less demanding when the two major
parties only need to be perceived as opposites. An educated electorate may be a common goal
of all industrialized democracies, but parties within two-party systems do not have as intense
of a vested interest to seek high educational outcomes to benefit their elections. A body of
knowledge of many different avenues of policy or policymaking in general are simply not
necessary when there are only two choices. The two parties within the system also have a
vested interest in the system remaining a two-party system in order to stay in power. It can be
argued that because of these factors, two-party systems do not have as much to gain from high
educational outcomes. Because elected officials create educational policy that directly
influences educational outcomes, two-party systems may not exhibit as high educational
outcomes as multiparty systems due to these factors.
Furthermore, countries with more party competition tend to have higher public
expenditures per student (Verner, 1979). This is congruent with the tendency to expand
budgets as a whole as party competition increases. Similarly, recently democratized countries
in Africa have shown that multiparty competition has led to an increase in education spending
(Stasavage, 2005). While beyond the scope of this paper’s focus, further inquiry into the
effects of party competitiveness on education may be fruitful based on these findings.
The distinctions between the forms of party systems are important to determine for
several reasons. Each party system holds implications that affect the process of governance in
a country, notably in the makeup of legislative bodies. The makeup and primary goals of the
legislative bodies are determined by the single ruling party or multiple parties within a
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coalition. Research suggests that education has become an important issue for political parties
as more and more parties throughout liberal democracies support expanding education
(Jakobi, 2011). The increased salience of education throughout the world begs the
investigation of the effects that political decisions are having on educational policy
throughout the world.
These decisions include the allocation of public funding which affects the number of
students to a classroom, teachers’ compensation, and the quality of resources their schools
have. Political decisions dictate the curriculum and standards that are expected of each grade
level, and the requirements for school leaving qualifications and grade promotion.
Furthermore, studies show that politically strong teachers’ unions have a positive effect on
educational access reforms, involving updating resources and facilities, financial support, and
compensation (Fabella, 2016). These decisions are not always dictated by the central, federal
government, but are influenced, especially financially, by the federal government (Fabella,
2016). Attempting to isolate and identify the impacts that political institutions have on
educational outcomes, like test scores, is an important step to understanding the most
beneficial conditions to promote high quality education around the world.
Additionally, competitive political parties are closely related to the health and strength
of democracy. The relationship between education and democracy has substantial empirical
support (Glaeser et al., 2007). Education tends to lead to increased participation and
engagement in civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1989). Education, as well, has been shown
to have a democratizing effect (Alemán & Kim, 2015). This effect is stronger in poorer, less
developed countries, yet is still significant to democracy’s health in advanced, industrialized
countries as well (Alemán & Kim, 2015). This relationship may provide an explanation for
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educational outcomes in the growing number of backsliding democracies, especially in
Eastern and Central Europe (Csaky, 2020).
Additional Determinants of Education Outcomes
Economic Determinants
Education is an incredibly complex issue, so it is fully expected that political party
systems are not going to be the only nor the primary determinant of educational outcomes
nationally. Democratic states spend more money on basic public education, both in total
spending and a percentage of GDP, than nondemocracies that often prefer to prioritize elite
education or other sectors (Jakobi, 2011). Considering the benefits of education and the
widespread, universal goal of liberal democracy to provide quality education at all levels,
there is a significant amount of research to examine what drives educational outcomes.
Individually, socioeconomic status is the most consistent determinant of scholastic
achievement worldwide (Montt, 2011). This effect is due to several factors including
educational attainment and economic status of one’s parents. Socioeconomic status of
individual schools’ student bodies helps to predict inequalities in performance in comparison
to other schools (Montt, 2011). Generally, the wealthier and the higher the social status a
student enjoys, the higher their outcomes increase compared to students of lower
socioeconomic status (Montt, 2011). The cross-national focus of this paper necessitates a
broader outlook to include a calculated average of a national population’s wealth and
educational attainment. This has been accomplished throughout the literature with GDP and
average education level (Verner, 1979). These measurements would account for not just
economic status, but for family background as well. Other environmental features including
the extent of urbanization, literacy, the amount of electric energy consumption per capita, and
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the number of doctors has been used to provide a broader picture of the large-scale
socioeconomic conditions by indicating the level of industrialization of a state (Verner, 1979).
Generally, the more urbanized, literate, industrialized, wealthy, and healthy, the higher the
educational outcomes in a country (Verner, 1979). These societal structures and inequities are
quite stable socioeconomically, which is beneficial from a research perspective (Schlicht,
2010).
It is necessary to look at wealth inequality to fully understand socioeconomic status. In
countries with high inequality, data may be skewed by the disparities in outcomes at either
end of the spectrum of wealth. On a more individual level, income inequality can drastically
impact student outcomes depending on if they go to a “good” or “bad” school (Perry, 2009).
Similarly to countries as a whole, a school’s socioeconomic composition has a strong
association with student achievement (Perry, 2009). Students from high-income families are
more likely to score higher on standardized tests and further their education than low-income
families (Montt, 2011). However at the national level and somewhat surprisingly, research
shows that low levels of income inequality do not necessarily translate to equitable outcomes
across countries of similar levels of inequality (Perry, 2009; Montt, 2011). High-performing
and highly equitable countries have low poverty rates, low levels of income inequality, a
robust compulsory education system, and low levels of school choice (Perry, 2009). However,
lower-performing, more inequitable countries do not have such clear-cut commonalities
(Perry, 2009). Other studies have shown a very slight correlation between outcomes and
income inequality, but is insignificant when controlling for other variables (Montt, 2011).
This finding supports the assumption that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to attain high
educational outcomes. There are a significant number of factors at play concurrently.
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Bureaucratic Determinants
On a more individual level, the literature shows that school-level variability such as
class size, student to teacher ratio, overall quality of resources, quality of teachers, and public
expenditure on education have an influence on educational outcomes (Montt, 2011). Countries
around the world vary in the ages that children start compulsory education, the length of the
school year and school day, and the level of student enrollment (Montt, 2011). Student teacher ratios in particular, which are a result of a jurisdiction’s educational policy and
expenditure, have shown to influence educational outcomes greatly. Narrower ratios imply a
more attentive teacher which tends to have a positive impact on students’ educational
experience regardless of the competence or educational level of that teacher (Verner, 1979).
Countries that invest in the teacher workforce also tend to have higher enrollment, improved
performance, and more equitable outcomes (Montt, 2011). States with lower student-teacher
ratios can be interpreted as the political system exerting more effort into education (Verner,
1979).
Enrollment levels paint a more complicated picture of a nation. There are countless
explanations for lower enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education that are very
country specific. The level of enrollment is important because the lower enrollment is the
more likely there are significant barriers, whether financial or social, that prevent individuals
from attaining quality education. Explanations may include barriers to access like poverty,
hunger, the need for children and/or adolescents to work instead of attending school, and
access to healthcare and other important resources. These are often represented with poverty
rates and out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures per capita, respectively. Health and
educational outcomes are largely interlinked due to their reliance on socioeconomic status and
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inequalities (Siddiqi et al., 2011). Countries with fewer inequalities have higher outcomes
related to both health and education. These inequalities, regardless of extent or degree, exert
an influence over all children throughout each nation (Siddiqi et al., 2011). There is an
incentive to eliminate these barriers and achieve high enrollment to ensure educational access
to as many school-aged children as possible.
Public expenditure per student has shown to influence educational outcomes. Due to
their emphasis on social welfare, states with social democratic party majorities are more likely
to spend money on education than conservative party majorities (Busemeyer, 2006). But does
spending more money necessarily translate into higher quality educational outcomes? Using
the average government expenditure per student will help show the correlation, if any,
between a government’s financial support and investment and their educational outcomes.
Public expenditures per student measure the ability and willingness of a country to spend
funds on education (Verner, 1979). Considering the variability in central vs. regional control
of financing education, it is important to acknowledge the structure of funding for education
in each country and the defined purpose of the cost per pupil. The aspects of education
specifically emphasized in public funding and the efficiency to which a country executes their
goals may influence the outcomes attained.
There is much to consider within this measurement. First, more socioeconomically
developed countries tend not to exhibit as much central control over their educational finances
(Verner, 1979). Because of this, the effects of education spending vary greatly between
different jurisdictions and can be difficult to generalize. Secondly, the efficiency of spending
is an important insight into what this measurement describes. A state may dedicate a larger
sum of public funds to education than another yet receive a smaller return in educational
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outcomes. Therefore, not all spending on education has equal weight, especially in high
income countries with existing high GDPs (Siddiqi et al, 2012). The relationship between
spending and outcomes is hardly deterministic because of this (Lee, 2014). Improvi ng
efficiency in spending contributes to competitiveness on the world stage and often involves
reforming the state education system (Fabella, 2016). Due to the large undertaking this
requires, it is reasonable to assume that the efficiency of spending is rather stable.
Moreover, it is likely that teachers’ unions have some sort of effect on the public
policy and bureaucratic decisions regarding education through their two main avenues of
action: collective bargaining and political organizing. Collective bargaining agreements
regulate education policy about measuring teachers’ evaluations, class size, student
placement, instruction, curriculum, compensation, working conditions, and other important
matters related to practitioners (Cowen & Strunk, 2014). They often restrict the flexibility of
school districts in an effort to protect and advance the goals of teachers (Cowen & Strunk,
2016). Hoxby (1996) shows that unionized districts in the United States spend more, even if
not on teachers’ compensation, and have higher dropout rates than non-unionized or weakly
unionized districts. A replication of this study within a single state found unions had no
significant impact on student outcomes (Lovenheim, 2009). As for union’s political
organizing, they are often perceived to be blockers of reforms that seek to change the status
quo, but that the relative strength of unions plays a role in the political power that they are
able to wield (Cowen & Strunk, 2016). However, only a small number of studies have
investigated the impact of unions on students’ educational outcomes and have produced
conflicting evidence (Cowen & Strunk, 2016). Average American students fair better in union
schools, while low- and high-performing students tend to fare better in nonunion schools
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(Ebert, 2007). It is difficult to identify and generalize conclusions and their proposed
solutions because of the wide variation and lack of control in performing this type of research
(Ebert, 2007). For example, union negotiations may spillover into nonunion districts as an
attempt by administrative officials to ward off unionizing, further complicating analysis of the
effects of unions (Gindin & Finger, 2013). Additionally, union districts often benefit from
attracting and retaining teachers, and positively affect wages and spending (Gindin & Finger
2013). While unionization will not be included within this paper’s analysis due to a lack of
readily available data, it informs the argument regarding public expenditures per student.
More research on the impacts of unions on educational outcomes may be fruitful for future
analysis.
Health as a Determinant
Additionally, the cost, accessibility, and quality of healthcare and a population’s health
in general may have effects on educational outcomes. The general health of a country relies
on its healthcare system, and ultimately reflects the wealth and dedication a country is willing
to invest (Montt, 2011). Education and health often have similar determinants, but these
similarities diverge significantly when it comes to income inequality (Siddiqi et al., 2011).
There is a strong association with mortality rates in high-income countries with high income
inequality (Siddiqi et al., 2011). While these determinants do not have the same effect on
educational outcomes, health itself plays an important role in these outcomes, particularly
food insecurity and hunger (APA, 2020). Food insecurity is defined as a lack of nutritious
foods to have good health and is quite common even in advanced industrial democracies like
the US and Canada (Ke & Ford-Jones, 2015). Both food insecurity and hunger can cause toxic
stress, a near constant activation of the body’s stress management system, and diminished
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cognitive bandwidth (APA, 2020). Because of this, children that go to school hun gry focus on
food and often have a diminished capacity to concentrate on other things like schoolwork (Ke
& Ford-Jones, 2015). Food insufficiency contributes to many poor health conditions,
including chronic illnesses, anxiety, depression, colds, stomachaches, and even can negatively
impact brain development, learning, information processing, and educational outcomes (APA,
2020). Because poverty does not simply affect the children of the family, it is intuitive that
this combination of toxic stress and diminished concentration would likely extend to children
if a close relative, especially within the household, is experiencing poor health, even unrelated
to food insecurity. The ability to afford both sufficient nutritious foods and quality healthcare
is key to avoiding these issues.
Hypothesis and Theoretical Model
It is possible that because of their explicit influence on policy and political structure as
a whole, political parties and the needs of elected legislative officials within those parties will
have an effect on the educational outcomes of a country’s public. In both types of party
systems, educational policies that frame and inform the educational systems are influenced
directly by the political parties and their individual office holders, whether elected or
appointed. There is some debate about the desirability of an educated electorate and if
desirable, to what degree (Hansen, 2009). There are two main approaches: the elite and the
deliberative. The elite approach views other personal factors not related to political education,
like aggregated opinions and mental shortcuts, more important to voters’ choices than a fully
informed electorate (Hansen, 2009). On the other hand, the deliberative approach requires
voters to make informed decisions of political parties and politicians, usually understood
through choice of party and personal values. Hansen (2009) acknowledges that political
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knowledge has a greater influence in multi-party systems than two-party systems. He argues
this is due to the number of parties competing for power. It is this same principle that informs
my theory. Because of the broader selection of choices available, I argue that more political
knowledge is needed to participate in politics through the ballot box. States with multipart y
political systems then have a vested interest in a more educated electorate and therefore will
have higher educational outcomes to achieve this goal.
It is important to investigate the distinctiveness of political parties to fully understand
how the public conceives of the political party system. Research from the US and Australia,
both two-party systems, shows that the public perceive the two major parties as polar,
mirrored opposites (Nicholson et al., 2018). On the other hand, multiparty systems, as
depicted in Canada and Hungary, show that the public also perceives parties on the opposing
ends of the political spectrum as opposites, but that parties on the same side of the left -right
political spectrum were still highly differentiated (Nicholson et al., 2018). This supports the
argument that electorates in multiparty systems have a more pressing need to differentiate
between parties than in two-party systems that solely rely on pure opposites. I argue that this
need for differentiation and distinctiveness translates into different needs for education. States
with multi-party systems would have a greater need for high quality education that would
allow the electorate to properly distinguish the larger number of parties within their system.
To assume that political party system’s influences are the only influence would be
unwise and illogical. It is prudent and necessary to examine the other factors known to have
an effect on educational outcomes. The factors examined in this paper in addition to type of
party system are a country’s wealth, level of wealth inequality, the strength and health of
democracy, public education expenditures per student, out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures,
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and student-teacher ratios. These variables allow the focus to be placed on a broader, national
level in order to compare educational outcomes cross-nationally and the effect that wealth,
poverty, and access to necessities like affordable healthcare have on education. Unfortunately,
this approach will leave out some of the very important but more individually based elements
that exert influence on students’ achievement. Similarly, the usage of national averages will
eliminate the nuance that comes with the nuance of different jurisdictions within a country.
From this discussion, I developed the following hypotheses:
H1: Countries with multiparty systems will have higher educational outcomes than two -party
systems.
H2: Countries with healthier democracies will have higher educational outcomes.
H3: The wealthier a country is, the higher their educational outcomes will be.
H4: The higher income inequality a country has, the lower their educational outcomes.
H5: The more money a country spends on education federally, the higher their educational
outcomes will be.
H6: The more affordable a country’s healthcare is, the higher their educational outcomes.
H7: Countries with lower student-teacher ratios will have higher educational outcomes.
Research Design
The object of my research is to determine factors that influence general educational
outcomes in developed democracies. The thirty-seven OECD member states are the sample
that will be quantitatively analyzed, as the availability of data permits. 2 Unavailable data for
specific countries will be indicated as needed with each respective variable. These countries

2

OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom (UK), United States (US)
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were chosen based on their general status as developed, liberal democracies, with the
exception of Turkey, with varying political party system types and wealth. OECD provides a
great deal of accessible data for these countries and allows for a robust analysis.
Dependent variable: PISA educational outcomes
In line with many other cross-national comparative studies, I will be operationalizing
my dependent variable with data from the Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA) tests from 2018. Due to anomalies in testing data received from Spain’s PISA reading
tests, Spain’s 2018 reading score has not been released by OECD. Considering Spain’s
reading scores have remained relatively stable since 2000 4, I will utilize Spain’s 2015
Reading score for the purposes of this study.
The PISA test is administered and analyzed by OECD. It tests and aggregates data
from randomly selected 15-year-olds, irrespective of grade level, in 79 high- and middleincome countries every three years on three subjects: mathematics, reading, and science
(Schleicher, 2019). It is not a subject test, but instead tests students’ abilities to us e wider
knowledge, concepts, and skills in these three core subjects within real-life situations (Lee,
2014). It also questions students about their family background, learning habits, and
engagement and motivation in school (Montt, 2011). It has been used extensively throughout
the literature to compare educational outcomes across countries (Busemeyer, 2012; Lee, 2014;
Montt, 2011; Perry, 2009; Peter et al., 2009; Samuelsson & Lindblad, 2015; Siddiqi et al.,
2011; Schlicht et al., 2010).
Although, there are some drawbacks to utilizing this particular test. It only studies 15year-olds, excluding primary and tertiary schooling altogether. Considering individuals in the
countries within this study are able to vote at age eighteen and not all individuals atten d
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tertiary school, studying the average educational achievement of 15-year-olds is not too far of
a departure from the education of a voting aged 18-year-old. Since it is cross-sectional and not
a longitudinal study, it only measures particular students at one specific point in time (Montt,
2011). Therefore, it is not effective to provide historical or causal explanations (Montt, 2011).
Further, it is scaled to show normal distribution, making cross-national differences less visible
(Perry, 2009). Even with the caveats to the usage of the PISA test, it is a useful starting point
to assess real-world educational outcomes related directly to students’ performance cross nationally (Humburg and van der Velden, 2015). Cumulating all three scores is not standard
practice within the literature because it distorts data. Because of its relevance to the
electorate’s ability to engage in politics, I will use the reading score specifically. I will obtain
this data from the OECD’s Volume 1 of PISA 2018 Results 3 and Spain’s 2015 score from Our
World in Data’s Quality of Education database 4.
Independent Variables
Political party system
The primary goal of this paper is to determine the correlation between the type of
political party systems and educational outcomes. It is expected that multiparty systems will
have higher educational outcomes than two party systems. For the most accurate assessment
of the number of political party systems, I will measure this with the effective number of
parties determined by Laasko and Taaeperne (1979). It is defined as one over the sum of the
square of the percentage of seats/votes won by each party within a system (Laasko &
Taaeperne, 1979). I will utilize seat share instead of vote share since educational policy is

3

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/28450521-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/28450521-en

4

https://ourworldindata.org/quality-of-education
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controlled by elected policymakers, not candidates. This will allow each analyzed country to
be most accurately categorized as a two-party or multiparty system. The data that I utilize was
compiled through Gallagher’s (2019) Election indices dataset at Trinity College Dublin5.
Strength of Democracy
Due to the empirical evidence for a correlation between democracy and education and
the significance of party politics in keeping democracies healthy, it is appropriate to examine
this relationship. I expect countries with healthier democracies to have higher educational
outcomes than countries with weaker democracies. I will use Freedom House’s (2020) Global
Freedom Scores to measure this variable 6. Freedom Scores measures more than the health of
democracy electorally, including real-world political rights, civil liberties, and freedoms of
individuals, and is therefore a more robust, inclusive measurement for understanding the
breadth of democracy comparatively (Countries and Territories, 2020).
Wealth
Considering socioeconomic status is one of the key determinants in student
performance, it is essential to include this variable in my analysis (Montt, 2011). It is
expected that the wealthier a country is, the higher educational outcomes they will exhibit. I
will be measuring this variable with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, to account for a
country’s wealth adjusted for population. Admittedly, there is much nuance lost with using
averages to sum up an entire country’s socioeconomic position. However, this allows for an

5

https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf

6

https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores
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estimated comparison between several countries. I will obtain this information from OECD’s
database7.
Income Inequality
Wealth distribution and income inequality are a separate but equally important features
of a state’s socioeconomic condition. I expect countries with lower levels of inequality to
have higher educational outcomes. I will measure wealth inequality with the Gini coefficient.
The Gini coefficient codes income inequality where a score of zero is perfect equality and a
score of one is perfect inequality (Perry, 2009). I will acquire this information from the
OECD’s database8. There is no data given for Spain, New Zealand, Japan, Colombia, or
Turkey. These countries have been excluded from the sample for a total sample size of 32
countries.
Public expenditure per student
Public expenditure per student measures the willingness and ability of a country to
invest in education. Although there is a great deal of nuance within this measurement, I expect
that the countries that spend more money per student will have higher educational outcomes.
Since the PISA test measures 15-year-olds regardless of grade level, I will be using total
expenditure per student in primary and secondary school combined. I will acquire this data
from the OECD’s database9. Expenditures are expressed in equivalent USD converted using
purchasing power parities (PPPs) for GDP to account for the relative cost of local goods,
services, and inflation rates (OECD, 2021). There is no available data for Switzerland and

7

https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm
9
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/total-expenditure-on-educational-institutions-per-full-time-equivalentstudent-2017_6463e5d4-en
8
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Greece. These countries have been excluded from this sample for a total sample size of 35
countries.
Healthcare costs
Beyond the school level, there are many environmental factors that may affect
students’ ability to attend or perform in school. Hunger, poverty, access to healthcare or
resources for disabilities, or the need to provide for the family would greatly affect students’
outcomes. The effect of toxic stress caused by food insecurity, poverty, and stressful home
situations are particularly troubling in relation to concentration in school and increasing risk
for adverse health outcomes (Ke & Ford-Jones, 2015). High healthcare costs are often
associated with a slow descent into poverty, either chronic or transient poverty, even in
developed, wealthy countries like the US (Krishna, 2020). Because of this interaction between
health and education, I expect countries with more affordable healthcare systems to have
higher educational outcomes. To estimate the accessibility and affordability of healthcare, I
will use the amount of out-of-pocket healthcare expenses per household per capita, as a
percentage of total health expenditure. This measurement allows for more analysis into the
affordability of healthcare than simply insurance coverage, especially considering the vast
majority of OECD countries, with the exception of the US, have universal or near -universal
public healthcare 10. I will acquire this data from the WorldBank’s database 11. The values are
expressed in USD per capita converted into PPPs for GDP.
Student teacher ratios

10

https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=INSIND

11

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.OOPC.PC.CD?end=2018&name_desc=false&start=2018&type=s
haded&view=map
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As depicted in much of the literature, student-teacher ratios and enrollment play a role
in educational outcomes. Considering the difficulty of assessing teachers’ competence and
ability nationally, let alone cross-nationally, student-teacher ratios can be used to estimate
teacher impact on student’s performance and well-being. As aforementioned, lower studentteacher ratios tend to have positive effects on students due to the implied higher level of
attention given to students by virtue of a smaller class size (Verner, 1979). I expect a similar
outcome. I will utilize student-teacher ratios for secondary schools considering PISA tests 15year-olds. I will retrieve this data from the WorldBanks’s datasets from the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 12. Australia’s data will be
retrieved from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 13.
Results & Discussion
I will be performing a quantitative analysis over the hypotheses listed in my theoretical
model. I examine the thirty-seven OECD member states in order to discover correlations
between my independent variables and educational outcomes. The data I collected is as
follows.

12
13

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRL.TC.ZS
https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/education/schools/latest-release
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Effective Number of Political Parties & Education
in OECD Member Countries
Figure 2
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When comparing the effective number of parties with educational outcomes, I find no
relationship. Running a correlation between the two variables produces a correlation
coefficient of -0.048, almost exactly no correlation. Multiparty systems greatly outnumber
two-party systems within OECD member countries. Even amongst two- to two-and-a-half
party systems, including the US, UK, Canada, Hungary, Turkey, Japan, and Mexico, there is
an extremely wide variety of PISA scores. The data clearly depicts that the type of political
party system on its own has no effect on the educational outcomes of students. The proposed
stronger vested interests of multiparty systems compared to two party systems mentioned
within my theoretical model do not translate into reality. The other hypotheses tested may
further explain these differences in scores amongst countries with similar party systems.
An internal analysis from Sweden states that the Social Democrats would lose 1.4
percent of support and Liberals would gain 6.3 percent of support if the Swedish voters were
fully informed (Hansen, 2009). Hansen (2009) states that there has been support for the
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number of parties having a positive effect on the impact of political knowledge and that there
is a clear relationship between education and political knowledge. Unfortunately, this concept
does not have an effect in this sample of OECD member states. Hansen (2009) finds a
correlation between the support for right-leaning parties and an increase in political
knowledge, exhibited in the US, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. Although my analysis does
not include the placement of parties nor their distinctiveness from each other on the political
spectrum, this may be an interesting concept to test in the future with a larger sample.
Considering the lack of evidence of correlation between party systems and educational
outcomes, it is unlikely that other party-related institutional features like party distinctiveness
will have an influence on the outcomes of students.
Busemeyer (2006) found that social-democratic parties are more likely to support
education than conservative parties, congruent with each ideologies’ perspective on
government spending. Because parties within two-party systems tend to coalesce in the
middle of the political spectrum, and multiparty systems tend to have more spread out,
ideologically varied parties, it is intuitive that social democratic parties are more frequently
found in states with multiparty systems. This situation presents a difficult “chicken -or-theegg” scenario for the purposes of this research paper. While the party system cr eates the
environment for social democratic parties to survive and even flourish, it begs the question to
discover the underlying principles of that state that led to the multiparty system’s existence. A
more detailed qualitative analysis of the position of a state’s political parties on the
ideological spectrum would be beneficial to examine this further.
Another possible explanation is that other mechanics such as polarization are the main
drivers behind party distinctiveness, not education. (Nishikawa, 2012). When polarization is
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low, parties may not successfully differentiate themselves as distinct choices, especially in
two party systems (van der Eijk & Franklin, 2005). There is significant evidence that as a
party system grows more polarized, the easier it becomes for the electorate to distinguish
parties (Lupu, 2015). Heightened party polarization often increases the salience of political
parties, intensifying partisan conflict as disagreements become more heated (Lupu, 2015).
Lupu (2015) describes that polarization can have a stabilizing effect on developing
democracies, but in already established, advanced democracies, party polarization can have a
corrosive effect. There is further evidence for this within OECD member states. The intensity
of freedom has a strong positive correlation with educational outcomes. Whether this
destabilization of democracy is a result of increasing polarization, gridlock, or other country level factors, the relationship between education and the strength of a democracy is clear.
Running a correlation between PISA reading scores and Freedom Scores, the correlation
coefficient is 0.548. As expected, this positive relationship is moderate, yet clear. Considering
this democratizing effect is stronger among lower income countries, expanding the sample
beyond OECD members states may show more conclusive results.
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Freedom Index and Education Outcomes
in OECD member countries
Figure 3
PISA Reading scores 2018
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It is reasonable to conclude that an educated general public, and therefore educated
electorate, is simply an inherent goal in healthy democracies. By the virtue of participating in
the OECD’s PISA test to cross-nationally examine the strength of their educational systems,
the benefits of education in and of themselves are incentive enough to desire strong
educational outcomes.
Consistent with my hypothesis and the literature at the individual level and country
level, there is a correlation between wealth and educational outcomes. Running a correlation
between wealth and education, the correlation is .387, relatively weak but clearly positive.
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Wealth and Education in OECD member countries
Figure 4
PISA reading scores 2018
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It is worth noting that research has shown that in already advanced capitalist
economies, increasing GDP has not proven to benefit educational outcomes, with a similar
result relating to health outcomes and life expectancy (Siddiqi et al., 2011). More specifically,
national increases in health spending have not shown to correlate with positive health
outcomes (Siddiqi et al., 2011). This implies that in the world’s wealthiest countries, growth
is not effective to improve quality of life. Expanding the sample to less rich, non -OECD
member countries in future analysis may warrant more conclusive results.
By that same token, income inequality has a clear negative relationship with
educational outcomes. As income inequality increases, educational outcomes decrease. The
correlation coefficient is -0.4227, showing a moderate negative relationship. According to this
data, income inequality has a stronger impact on educational outcomes than a country’s
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wealth. This comparison is not affected by the slightly different sample size due to
unavailable income inequality data 14.

Income inequality and Education
in OECD member states
Figure 5
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On an individual level, social-democratic states, such as Finland, show little to no
relationship between school-level socioeconomic status and educational outcomes compared
to liberal welfare states such as Canada (Peter, 2010). As shown in Figure 3, these states also
have the lowest levels of income inequality. Peter’s (2010) finding is replicated in this
analysis. The effect of income inequality may have far-reaching effects, as discussed below.

14

With the same sample size of 32, GDP/per capita and educational outcomes have an even weaker relationship
with a correlation coefficient of 0.299.
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Effects of Educational Spending
in OECD member states
Figure 6
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There is a moderate positive relationship between government spending per student
and educational outcomes. The correlation coefficient for these variables is 0.443. This is the
expected result, with educational outcomes increasing as spending per student increases .
However, the intersection of spending per student and other socioeconomic factors like
income inequality, the sources of additional funding, and bureaucratic factors like the effects
of unions may play a hidden role. I examine this further by analyzing both the OECD member
countries that spend the most (over $10,000 per student) and the countries that have the
highest educational outcomes (a PISA score of over 500).
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Countries spending over $10,000 per student and
edcuational outcomes
Figure 7
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Spending per student in OECD countries with
PISA scores over 500
Figure 8
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Among countries that spend the most, there is a moderate negative correlation between
spending per student and educational outcomes. Figure 7 depicts a correlation coefficient of 0.485, only slightly stronger than the initial analysis of all OECD member countries.
Countries like Finland and Canada spend a relatively small amount of money and recoup the
highest educational outcomes within the sample. Among countries that have the highest PISA
scores, there is a negative correlation between spending as well. Figure 8 depicts a correlation
coefficient of -0.502, even stronger than both previous analyses of spending. Countries like
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Poland, Estonia, and Ireland have among the highest educational outcomes in all OECD
member states and spend significantly less per pupil than countries like the US and Denmark
who receive much lower educational returns compared to their financial investment. This is
not meant to discount that spending overall does seem to have a correlation with educational
outcomes. However, it is evident that spending as a whole does not encompass the entire
picture nor directly lead to higher educational outcomes. This can be explained through
several different factors.
For example, the role of inequality and sources of additional funding may explain the
disparity in spending versus educational return for the US. The US has a relatively highincome inequality for the size of its economy, which translates into large income disparities in
different communities since as a very small percentage of the population holds much of the
country’s wealth. K-12 education has historically been financed primarily through property
taxes and state funding (Shaw, 2010). Because of this, the importance of federal funding may
be reduced. Therefore, educational outcomes would rely primarily on each individual school
district’s socioeconomic status and their willingness to invest in education. Funds are not
redistributed across local municipalities (Siddiqi et al., 2011). Hence, a school district’s
funding will vary significantly due to the intensity of income inequality in their geographical
location. On the other hand, Canada spends considerably less than the US yet receives higher
educational outcomes. Canada’s educational funds are collected by provinces and distributed
across school districts per student (Siddiqi et al., 2011). Government spending contributes to
students’ success, but the country-level intricacies discovered within the data are more
important than the total sum.
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Affordability of healthcare & Education
in OECD member states
Figure 9
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There is a weak but significant negative relationship between the average out-ofpocket healthcare costs as a percentage of healthcare expenditures and educational outcomes.
Running a correlation with these variables produces a correlation coefficient of -0.391,
weaker than expected but still negative. As out-of-pocket spending increases, educational
outcomes decrease. This provides further evidence that health and education do have some
correlation to each other. It is unclear from this data which is the causal factor. However, it is
reasonable to conclude that both variables have an influence on each other. This aligns with
the literature on the topic (Siddiqi et al., 2011).
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Student-teacher ratios

Variation in Student-Teacher Ratios in OECD
Member States
Figure 10
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Student-teacher ratios do have a weak, negative relationship with educational
outcomes. Running a correlation shows the correlation coefficient is -0.304. Although weaker
than expected as student teacher ratios decrease, educational outcomes do tend to increase
slightly. This result may be influenced by the vast majority of OECD member countries
having similar and fairly low ratios. The average student-teacher ratio is 12:1. In order to
determine significance, a larger sample size may be necessary.
Conclusion
As expected, wealth and income inequality are strongly correlated with educational
outcomes across OECD member states. The status of democracy and freedom in a country
also prove to be important factors to attain high educational outcomes. Surprisingly, the
bureaucratic variables, spending, student-teacher ratios, and affordable healthcare, only
showed weak correlations. Additionally, my analysis disproved the hypothesis that political
party systems have an influence over the educational outcomes of a country. Finally, the
biggest conclusion from this paper is that there is no simple, one-size-fits-all answer to what
produces the best educational outcome for students. It can only give us insights t o some broad
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aspects that can contribute to high quality outcomes. It is extremely difficult to encapsulate
the entire picture.
For future analysis, a larger sample beyond economically developed, industrialized
democracies within OECD are likely to provide more insightful results. The inclusion of a
time element, utilizing data from multiple years of PISA tests, may also contribute to different
findings. Further investigation into the impacts of polarization and unionization on
educational outcomes may lead to a deeper understanding of comparative education policy.
Finally, more in-depth statistical analysis would provide more clarity of both existing and
future analyses.
While many stable, developed democracies within OECD are exhibiting more
polarization and signs of backsliding into authoritarianism, such as the US and Hungary, the
effect it will have on the education of children and the future electorate cannot be understated.
My analysis provides evidence that the principles of increasing economic growth, decreasing
inequality, and supporting strong democratic values support high educational outcomes. This
finding serves as more evidence for developing countries, backsliding democracies, and
strong, established democracies to continue to strive towards a creation of a more equal and
educated human race.
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